Japan's Central Bank goes shopping for shares

Heydon Traub, Boston Business Journal, November 15, 2002

In the United States, it is commonly accepted practice for companies to buy back their shares in the market, often in lieu of dividends. In Japan, this rarely happens. But there is a variation on this, which has been recently announced by the Bank of Japan (BOJ). The Central Bank itself plans to purchase shares from the troubled commercial banking sector.

Both the United States and Japan's rules prevent their central banks from purchasing shares. However, due to the ongoing crisis with Japan's economy, the Central Bank plans to seek approval from the Ministry of Finance to buy shares that commercial banks would like to sell.

What are the investment implications of this surprise move by the Central Bank? The initial reaction of most investors was that stock prices should move up, and in fact, they did. The plan was announced just before the close of trading in Japan on Sept. 18. Although the market was down for the day, the announcement reversed an ugly day as the Nikkei moved up about 2 percent intraday in response. The following day, the market moved up another 2 percent, but has since fallen back about 9 percent below where it was just before the announcement. This reflects the market's disappointment with the details and lack of fast follow-through.

Looking forward, the implications of this move are far from clear. There is little precedent of central banks intervening in a country's stock market. The most notable occurrence was when the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) jumped unannounced into the market during the 1998 Asian crisis and bought up stocks for three days. It did seem to stop the free-fall, and by the end of the next year the market had more than doubled. It has not fallen back to the crisis levels, despite the stock market declines the past few years. The HKMA has gradually sold off its shares via the creation of an exchange-traded fund (ETF) called the Tracker Fund. By most standards, the intervention was a success.

However, there are significant differences in the case of Japan. First, they are likely to wind up owning nonliquid or problem stocks that would be difficult to sell. This is because the banks will likely have the option to sell the Bank of Japan what they want. The large, liquid names can just as easily be sold in the market. This means selling these stocks may eventually be difficult for the bank.

Second, this move does not address the root of Japan's problems. The key factors most experts agree need to be resolved are the disposition of the banks' nonperforming loans (NPLs), i.e. cleaning up their balance sheet and reversing the deflation in the economy.

The latter can be addressed by rapidly increasing the money supply, and the government has recently presented an anti-deflation plan. Regarding the nonperforming loans, it seems the government's money would be better used if it were to buy the NPLs from the banks. This would finally restore a healthy banking system, something missing for about 12 years, and free up capital for banks to begin meaningful corporate lending again.

One key caveat here, though: Nonperforming loans are estimated to be 60 trillion to 120 trillion yen (roughly $502 billion to $1 trillion U.S.) with the government's estimate at the low end of this range. Thus, NPL purchases would require massive amounts of capital, compared with what would be needed for the share purchases.

Although the share repurchase is not ideal, there are several positives. At least part of the government (Bank of Japan, for instance) finally seems to be acknowledging the severity of the bank's problems and is looking to do something about it after years of inaction. In fact, the announcement seems to be more of a political move by the BOJ to force action and needed cooperation from other government entities to solve the bigger NPL issue. In addition, the planned holding period is 10 years, so this will not be a short-term fix where shares have to be sold soon.

Despite the reservations above, we think that the Bank of Japan's plan will be moderately positive for Japanese equities. In addition, the market's prolonged decline of almost 80 percent from its peak in 1989, along with an earnings recovery this year, has brought the market's price-earnings ratio based on expected earnings down to "just" 24. That may still sound high, but there are two points making Japan's stock market better priced than the United States, even though the equivalent p/e measure for the United States is just 18.

First, the quality of earnings is better in Japan. They report one set of books based on their taxes. Thus, they have an incentive to minimize reported taxes as opposed to the inflated operating earnings we see reported in the United States.

Unlike the United States, in Japan, for the most part, you don't see companies exclude large losses they have written off, and there is minimal use of options granted to employees. Second, interest rates are extraordinarily low, even compared with the United States. Short-term rates are zero and long-term government bond yields are about 1 percent. Thus, the dividend yield on the stock market is equal or higher than what investors can get in the fixed-income market. This creates incentive for local Japanese investors finally to buy stocks.

       

 

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